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THE SUBJECT OF CIRCULATION: ON THE DIGITAL SUBJECT’S TECHNICAL 
INDIVIDUATIONS 
 
The concept of the digital subject proposes that online subjectivity is a mediated 
construct. This article extends this concept by arguing that online subjectivity is not a 
property of human users, but of digital subjects enacted in circulating data. It 
develops the digital subject by, first, using Phillip Agre’s concept of “grammars of 
action” to argue that computational architectures exclude humans from the position 
of the user; and, second, using Gilbert Simondon’s and Yuk Hui’s philosophies of 
technology to posit the digital subject as a determinate technical entity that, as per 
Hui’s re-working of Simondon, inhabits a “digital milieu”. Online, this digital subject 
inverts the human-technology relationship. It individuates by entering circulation, 
excluding us from individuating whilst individuating us in turn. This article expands 
upon this claim by analysing projects by Amalia Ulman and Zach Blas and their 
thematisation of visibility, identity and authenticity in online subjectivity. 
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I. THE SUBJECT OF CIRCULATION 
It’s platitudinous to claim that the internet has become one of subjectivity’s major 
contemporary sites. But the question of what subjectivity becomes once it moves 
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online continues to be a pressing one. Through its massively distributed services, its 
constitutive platforms, and the devices we use to access it, the internet exercises an 
increasingly pervasive influence on individual and collective subjectivity. The internet 
puts subjectivity into circulation in and as data—and in the circulation of data, 
subjectivity is subject, in turn, to technical processes that invite alternate conceptions 
of what the subject is and how it becomes. 
 
In this article, I want to adopt and extend Olga Goriunova’s concept of the “digital 
subject” (Goriunova, forthcoming; see also Lialina, 2017) to argue that the 
contemporary internet creates the conditions for a mode of subjectivity that emerges 
in and as circulating data. In Goriunova’s formulation, the digital subject is “an 
abstracted position, a performance, [a] constructed persona from data, profiles, and 
other records and aggregates” (2). This concept encompasses recognisable 
aggregates, like social media profiles; but it also extends to more ephemeral 
aggregates, like advertising profiles, alongside others we might not think of as 
“subjects”, like credit scores or profiles created by government services. These 
aggregates are often poor representations of the humans to which they refer. 
Conversely, they are arguably irreducible to the humans whom they predicate. The 
digital subject is not a poor facsimile of a particular human subject. Its very 
insufficiency opens up the possibility that it can be conceptualised as a substantive 
and concrete mode of subjectivity that isn’t strictly human, but something else. As I 
want to argue, what becomes—or, “individuates” (Simondon, 1992)—online is not 
you or us, but the digital subject itself. 
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To develop this claim, this article will combine theoretical reflections informed by 
recent media theory and a particular strand of the philosophy of technology with 
analyses of two recent artistic projects that thematise online subjectivity. In her 
conceptualisation of the digital subject, Goriunova further argues that “[d]igital 
subjects are something arising out of data generated about something, and become 
active in the computational infrastructure that enacts something else in turn” (13-14). 
This proposition suggests that the digital subject can be located in between the 
subject who interacts with distributed online services and the circulating data that 
these servies process. In media theory and in popular parlance, this subject is 
typically referred to as the user. Drawing on media-theoretical analyses of platforms 
and interfaces, I want to argue that this user is, itself, a construct. The user is 
prefigured by computational processes as a position that can be assumed by a 
human subject. On the other side of the interfaces that make interaction with these 
services possible, this position is designed to facilitate the capture and aggregation 
of the data we produce. These techniques, which Phillip Agre calls their “grammars 
of action” (1994), introduce a gap between subject and action, subjectivity and its 
construction, that’s indicated by the “user”—and that’s occupied by the digital 
subject. This article will propose that digital subject who occupies this position 
mediates the individuations of the human user whom it predicates.   
 
Mediation has numerous meanings across the humanities and social sciences (see 
Kember and Zylinska, 2012). I mean to adopt it in two, broadly media-theoretical 
senses. The digital subject is mediate; that is, it’s in between, occupying a position 
between the human(s) it refers to and the data they produce. But as a substitute for 
the—human—user, it also acts as a mediator, actively informing these users even as 
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it’s constructed as an aggregate out of the data they produce. This proposition is 
predicated on treating the digital subject as something more than an index or 
representation of a human user. Drawing on Gilbert Simondon’s philosophy of 
technology, I want to argue that the digital subject is a concrete—albeit still 
provisional—construct: what Simondon calls a “technical entity” (2017). To 
conceptualise the digital subject in these terms, this article will rely on Yuk Hui’s 
recent reworking of Simondon’s philosophy of technology for digital media. This 
concept allows us to conceive of the digital subject as a technical subject that 
individuates in circulating data. Or: as the subject of circulation. 
 
In making this claim, I don’t mean to valorise the technical agency of this entity at the 
expense of the human subject. This conception of subjectivity proposes, rather, that 
the internet creates the conditions in which subjectivity can be expressed by 
technical entities. Whilst it resonates with recent conceptualisations of subjectivity 
that emphasise its enmeshment with technology proposed in this journal and 
elsewhere, it departs from them in several crucial respects. This concept is not 
compatible with recent, new materialist ontologies, which treat technology as matter. 
Simondon differentiates between technical materiality and the materiality of 
“inorganic” entities, because the former expresses recursive forms of self-
organisation that can’t be explained through their materiality (2017; Stiegler, 1998, 
57). Nor is his conception of technology predicated on the critique of 
anthropomorphism that undergirds strains of “posthumanism” (see Callus and 
Herbrechter, 2012). The theoretical framework that I want to propose avoids invoking 
a totalising conception of technological systems that informs subjectivation—either 
directly, by channelling subjects’ desiring production; or indirectly, by eliciting its 
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subversion (Wiley and Elam, 2018; see also Kittler, 1999). The concept of 
subjectivity I mean to outline using the digital subject allows us to apprehend and 
critique the new modes of online subjectivation—or individuation—that the internet 
makes possible. These modes might be technical, in the strong, conceptual sense, 
but they arguably give us critical purchase on the cultural politics that are emerging 
around distributed online services that are engineered to traffick in subjectivity.  
 
To illustrate the political stakes of this concept, this article will develop its theoretical 
framework alongside engagements with two artistic projects: Excellences and 
Perfections by Amalia Ulman and Face Cages by Zach Blas. This decision to engage 
with artworks is deliberate. Online, subjectivity is enmeshed in technical processes 
that are complex, distributed, opaque, and, often, proprietary. In their recent media-
theoretical enquiry into interfaces, Christian Ulrik Andersen and Søren Bro Pold 
argue that artistic projects make this complexity available for theorisation and 
analysis (2018). These projects’ respective themes of visibility and objectification 
illustrate how digital subjects are constituted through techniques of data capture and 
aggregation; how these digital subjects individuate in and through data’s circulation; 
and how their individuations mediate our own in turn—sometimes to our benefit, or 
sometimes to our detriment. To apprehend these politics, we arguably need to be 
able to understand both how data is captured and circulated online and how the 
circulation of data informs new modes of subjectivity. 
 
This article’s concern in theory and philosophy and its analyses of artistic projects 
converge in circulation. Circulation is a concrete technical process: online, data 
circulates. Whilst circulation is widely invoked describe the processes by which data, 
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information, or media are spread, sent, circuited, returned, or transmitted across the 
humanities and social sciences, it’s arguably not clearly articulated as a concept of 
media (see Wark and Wark, forthcoming). This article’s overarching premise is that 
this process is constitutive of the digital subject. In proposing that the digital subject 
emerges in and as the circulation of data, I mean to demonstrate how something like 
a digital subject emerges in circulation and to intimate why this term is crucial to the 
conceptualisation, analysis, and critique of our contemporary media situation. The 
concept of the digital subject allows us to ask a crucial question: After the internet 
and in circulation, to what uses can subjectivity be put? This question is shadowed 
by another: When subjectivity enters circulation, what else might it become?   
 
 
II. SUBJECT ≠ USER 
The basic proposition of the digital subject is that this mode of subjectivity emerges 
in the gap that distributed online services open between us and the data constructs 
that refer to, represent, or even act for us online. To begin to develop my proposition 
that the digital subject individuates in and as the circulating data that occupies this 
gap, I want to adopt the media-theoretical terminology of the “user” to distinguish 
between the modes of subjectivity that we express as users of distributed online 
services and the—technical—modes of subjectivity expressed by the digital subject.  
 
In media theory, it’s typical to refer to subjects who interact with media or 
computational processes as users (Lialina, 2012). This conceptual language is much 
less common in other humanities and social sciences disciplines—other than, 
perhaps, design theory. Its use in media theory originates in the applied computer 
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science discipline of Human-Computer Interaction, where it denotes a formal 
component of computational programs (Bardini, 2000). Through the pervasive 
cultural influence of big technology companies, it’s since become a part of popular 
parlance: distributed online services have x number of “users”, for instance, or our 
login credentials for services or for our personal devices identify us as their “users”. 
In the broader discipline of media and communication studies, scholars are more 
likely to refer to the subject of distributed online services or computational processes 
using terms like “the self” (e.g. Papacharissi, 2011) or “identity” (e.g. Marwick and 
boyd, 2011). Scholars of digital subcultures have adopted other, more specific terms 
for these subcultures’ modes of subjectivity: the troll, for instance (Phillips, 2015). But 
the user arguably retains a conceptual purchase on emergent modes of subjectivity 
that these other terms lack.  
 
As a term for the subject who interacts with distributed online services or media 
devices, the user emphasises this subject’s relationship with interfaces—that is, with 
the points at which they access these services or devices. This emphasis is crucial, 
because it foregrounds the active role that media’s interfaces play in shaping and 
constraining our interactions with them (Hookaway, 2014). Each of the above 
conceptions of the subject is distinct and each emphasises different aspects of our 
relationship to technology. But what they share is where they situate the subject: this 
subject is always situated on this side of the interface, always pictured on this side of 
the screen. Online, subjectivity is situated at specific sites: in profiles, home pages, 
descriptions, and biographies; sets of relations with other users, like friends lists, 
followers, and contacts; relational markers, like tags, hashtags, and notes; emotional 
signifiers, like emoji, statuses, and image filters or overlays; locational markers, like 
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geo-locational tags; and so on. For the human user, these sites might be treated as 
algorithmically-mediated representations of their actions, interactions, relations, or 
data. On the other side of the interface, distributed online services constitute the 
digital subject as an aggregate of the data captured by the actions that a user takes. 
The interfaces we use to interact with these services, platforms or devices act as 
intermediary layers between us and them. Crucially, they also mediate the location of 
the user at or between these sites.  
 
Goriunova’s digital subject proposes that distributed online services locate 
subjectivity on the other side of the interface. The concept of the digital subject 
responds to a constitutive ambiguity created by this relationship: the subject of a 
computational interface is not necessarily a human user, or indeed a human at all—
rather, it’s the occupant of a position that these interfaces define. The concept of the 
user can help us to further explicate why. One particular media-theoretical take on 
this concept suggests that the user can be understood as a construct that produced 
by computational processes for us to occupy in order to make interaction with them 
possible, positing the user as a “user position”.  
 
In his study of the figure of the user developed in the field of Human-Computer 
Interaction, Thierry Bardini asserts that computational interfaces are designed with a 
“representation of the user” from which the computer learns how to relate to actual 
users (2000, 104). For Bardini, this representation is, originarily, of the designer: their 
subjectivity shapes the eventual subject position the user can occupy. This claim 
resonates with Adrian Mackenzie’s approach to studying modes of subjectivity that 
emerge with the proliferation of predictive computational processes. For Mackenzie, 
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the actual subjects who develop predictive software function as “test cases” that we 
can use to understand how we might negotiate the automation and generalisation of 
anticipation in media technology (2013). Without discounting the artefactual 
persistence of human subjectivity in the design of computational processes, the user 
concept introduces another way of conceptualising emergent modes of subjectivity. 
The interfaces we use to access distributed online services establish the terms of our 
interaction with them. At the interface, our agency is constitutively entangled with the 
computational processes that enable it. We can push this claim even further. As 
Benjamin H. Bratton argues, “the User is not a type of creature but a category of 
agents; it is a position within a system without which it has no role or essential 
identity” (Bratton, 2015: 251, emphasis original). The interface is an abstraction that 
mediates between the user and computational processes; but so, too, is the user. It’s 
what Bratton calls a “user position”. This position need not be situated at the point of 
contact between user and device or service, the screen.  
 
The archetypal screen is one interface layered atop of several—what’s often referred 
to as the “stack” hierarchy of layers of computational abstraction that’s used to 
structure computational processes (Straube, 2016). Interfaces are established 
wherever computational layers of abstraction meet. As Matthew Fuller and Florian 
Cramer argue, interfaces are designed to “describe, hide, and condition the 
asymmetry between the elements conjoined” (150). This asymmetry extends beyond 
the human-device relation to other interfacial relations between other component 
layers of computational processes or distributed online services, which “themselves 
articulate, filter, and organize the activities modelled and modulated by the interface” 
(151). As Fuller and Cramer put it, this means that “[t]he distinction between a “user 
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interface”, an Application User Interface”—used by software to query other 
software—“and a computer control language is purely arbitrary” (2007, 150). What 
we call a “user” typically mediates between us and a distributed online service’s 
surface layer. But computational processes multiply interfacial points—and, 
therefore, gaps in which a user position might be constituted. This concept is useful 
because it helps us to understand just where digital subjects are constituted. My 
proposition is that the “user position” identified by Bratton formalises the space that’s 
filled by Goriunova’s digital subject.  
 
The digital subject allows us to think modes of subjectivity that emerge after the 
internet as—provisional, limited—mediators between us and these services. More 
radically, I want to claim that this construct can’t be human. Interfaces are designed 
to facilitate interaction, but they’re also designed to obscure. They “black box” these 
services, making them easier to use whilst obscuring their proprietary operations 
(Wark and Wark). They also obscure the constructed nature of the position that the 
user of a particular distributed online service occupies. The concept of the digital 
subject offers us a way to locate subjectivity on the other side of the interface—and 
to understand the role it plays as an in between. However, what the digital subject is, 
is not just defined by what it does—or that it interfaces. This claim risks reducing 
subjectivity to the exercise of agency. My proposition that the digital subject 
individuates and individuates us in turn requires more conceptual work. The digital 
subject is constituted in data captured by distributed online services, exposing it to a 
degree of complexity that makes it more than a representation of a particular user. 
How these techniques work, I want to turn to Amalia Ulman’s artistic project, 
Excellences and Perfections.  
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III. CAPTURE 
Amalia Ulman staged Excellences and Perfections was a four-month-long 
performance conducted on the Instagram platform in 2014. For three months, her 
account was given over to a pre-scripted narrative arc enacted using images, 
captions, tags, and through interactions with other users. In broad strokes, this 
narrative is relatively simple: a young woman breaks up with her boyfriend, responds 
by acting out in ways that are judged to be normatively-questionable, before 
renouncing this life in a confessional act of contrition and adopting a healthier 
lifestyle—all documented on the artist’s personal Instagram account. Taken as a 
whole, Excellences and Perfections fits common archetypes. Ulman argues that its 
three stages exemplify the three character tropes that are available to women online: 
the “cute girl”, the “sugar baby”, and the “life goddess” (Kinsey, 2016). What makes it 
interesting, for our purposes, is that it helps us to apprehend how a digital subject is 
constituted using platform-based techniques of data capture. 
 
Instagram is an example of a platform, the computational architecture that’s probably 
most often associated with new modes of online subjectivity. Many of the big 
services that define the contemporary internet are platforms—from social media 
services, like Facebook; to retailers, like Amazon; to search services, like Google. 
Platforms are designed to be populated by content generated by their users. As 
Anne Helmond puts it, platforms “decentralize” the production of data to users, whilst 
they “recentralise” the collection, aggregation, processing, and exploitation of that 
data (Helmond, 2015: 6). Importantly, platforms allow varying degrees of third-party 
S.Wark@warwick.ac.uk 
 
12 
access to the data they aggregate, so that developers can build other applications 
into their environments, from games and quizzes right through to scripts for 
commercial, academic, or even political research. This lends them what Helmond 
refers to as “programmability” (2015). The result is a dynamic computational 
environment shaped by the interplay between the data that users produce and its 
processing by platforms. Platforms represent a major new way to monetise and 
exploit the decentralised production of data. But they also engineer new forms of 
sociality—and act as one of the digital subject’s major sites. 
 
Platforms centralise data using techniques of capture that Phillip Agre 
calls “grammars of action” (1994). Grammars of action pre-structure what we can do 
on platforms and with other computational processes in order to easily turn our 
actions into data. Each act of relating or interacting we take on a platform—liking, 
sharing, friending, even clicking through to a link—simultaneously facilitates an 
action and produces standardised “data point” by allowing the “action and capture” to 
“happen simultaneously” (Gerlitz, 2017, 242). Perhaps counter-intuitively, the co-
incidence of action and capture engineered by grammars of action opens up the gap 
that the digital subject occupies. The functions of Instagram, the site of Excellences 
and Perfections, is comprised of grammars like fields in which images can be 
uploaded; comment boxes; hashtags; sharing functions; and so on. Each action we 
take at each of these sites is captured and then, crucially, processed in order to 
constitute a digital subject—that which uploads, comments, tags, shares, and so on. 
Online, subjectivity is captured and processed before its constituted. Moreover, the 
pre-formatting of data facilitates its circulation within platforms and between distinct 
distributed online services (Helmond, 2015, 6). Grammars utilised in distinct 
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computational architectures can be “folded in to one another” across platforms by 
clients, scripts, syndication, and other techniques (Gerlitz, 2017, 241-242). When our 
data is captured by these grammars of action, it’s exposed to the potential of 
entering circulation and being processed and recapitulated; when it’s aggregated, its 
subject to higher-order operations that recursively inform how digital subjects are 
constituted. The “programmable” platform scales the operations that the digital 
subject is subject to as occupant of a user position. As more data is produced by 
users, entered in to circulation, and circulated beyond particular platforms, 
subjectivity arguably becomes something else; it becomes technical. 
 
We can see how these processes work by returning to Excellences and Perfections. 
Taken at face value, Ulman’s performance demonstrates how the Instagram 
platform’s capacity to represent a “you” can be performatively misused. To constitute 
the “cute girl”, Ulman uploaded selfies and favoured pastel tones; to constitute the 
“sugar baby”, Ulman’s selfies became more revealing and her posts made more 
references to money, even suggesting—without ever actually revealing—that she’d 
had plastic surgery; and to constitute the “life goddess”, her images included the 
conspicuous consumption of healthy foods, an emphasis on exercise, and a liberal 
use of inspirational quotes. They seem to exploit Instagram’s representational 
functions to construe an alternate subject. But there’s arguably more to this 
performance than its narrative content or a critique of social media that might be 
ascribed to it.  
 
Ulman’s performance constructs its digital subject using the grammars of action 
available on the Instagram platform. To mark out the beginning of her performance, 
S.Wark@warwick.ac.uk 
 
14 
Ulman uploaded an image emblazoned, cryptically, with its title—“Excellences and 
Perfections”. Retroactively, this image marks the commencement of the performance 
and a period of hiatus for her usual output; or, the beginning of its narrative arc. 
When this post is first made, however, it can only have that specific meaning for 
Ulman. The persona she presented can’t be grasped in its fragments, but only 
makes sense in and through its cumulative actions—and the grammars that shape 
them. The digital subject it constitutes is only present in process, emerging in the 
user position that these grammars construe. Crucially, these grammars encourage 
particular kinds of behaviour: to upload more, to interact more, to be interacted with 
more, in turn; or, to be visible. Online, visibility is not merely a function of uploading a 
picture that tells a story. It’s the outcome of computational processing and its 
informed by grammars of action. The digital subject Excellences and Perfections 
presents is only provisionally present as long as it’s visibe. What this performance 
dramatises is how platforms mediate visibility,  
 
I want to explore the cultural politics of visibility that subtend the digital subject in the 
section after next. Before doing so, I first want to provide more theoretical support for 
the digital subject itself. The concepts of the user position and grammars of action 
open up a gap that’s filled by the digital subject. However, these concepts provide us 
with minimal insight into what it means for a digital subject to become—or, indeed, 
whether it can be treated as a subject. In the next section, I want to turn to the work 
of Simondon and Hui to place these reflections on the digital subject into a technical-
philosophical framework that will support my claim that the digital subject 
individuates in circulating data and that it individuates us in turn.  
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IV. TECHNICAL BECOMING 
After the work of Simondon, Hui, and—to a lesser extent—Bernard Stiegler, my 
proposition is that we can conceptualise the digital subject as a “technical entity”. 
This proposition is an ontological one. In making this claim, I don’t mean to suggest 
that digital subjects’ modes of subjectivity are homologous to humans’, or to replicate 
a form of “panpsychism” (Shaviro, 2014). Nor do I mean to displace other, human or 
post-human, modes of subjectivity made possible by the internet. For these 
philosophers, technical entities are neither proxies for human intentionality nor 
reducible to the matter that instantiates them (Stiegler, 1998, 1-3). Technical entities 
belong to a different category of being altogether: they posses what Simondon refers 
to as a “third mode of being”, expressing a wholly other kind of self-sufficiency 
(2017). Strictly speaking, the proposition that the digital subject can be 
conceptualised as a technical entity is not compatible with Simondon’s philosophy. 
To support this claim, I want to draw heavily on Hui’s recent reworking of Simondon’s 
philosophy for digital media. In general terms, it relies on synthesising two distinct 
components of Simondon’s philosophy: his concept of a third mode of being; and his 
concept of subjectivation, which he refers to as individuation. As I want to argue, this 
theoretical labour promises to help us to understand not only what a digital subject 
is, but why we might accord subjectivity to a technical entity.  
 
In Simondon’s philosophy, technology secures its own distinct form of sufficiency 
once it reaches a certain level of complexity. Complex technology differentiates itself 
from mere tools when it begins to regulate its operations in relation to its immediate 
environment (2017, 50-51), which Simondon follows Georges Canguilhem in calling 
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its “milieu” (see Canguilhem, 2008). An example would be a data farm. Data farms 
are storage centres full of rack-mounted computers organised into stacks and laid 
out in rows. Packing so many computers together generates large amounts of heat. 
To ease the cost of cooling all these computers, they’re often placed in naturally cool 
environments: in old bunkers, underground, or underwater, for instance. Their 
external environments are not just incidental to their design or how they function—
they become components of data farms’ operations. In Simondon’s language, these 
environments become internal and necessary components: what he calls an 
“associated milieu” (2017, 50). In defining their operations in relation to and apart 
from their environments, technical entities express what Simondon calls “internal 
coherence”, or a capacity to regulate their external relationships (2017, 50-51). In 
general terms, Simondon accords complex technologies a form of agency that’s not 
reducible to human design or to their materiality, but is a function of their situated, 
concrete operativity.  
 
In claiming that the digital subject is a kind of technical entity, my proposition is that 
it’s not just a representation of the human subject that it predicates, but that it 
expresses a technical mode of being possessed of its own sufficiency. But this claim 
doesn’t make a digital subject a subject. In Simondon’s conceptual language, the 
subject is defined by another capacity again, which he articulates using the term 
“individuation”—becoming. Simondon developed his concept of individuation through 
a critique of the premises underpinning classical ontology’s conceptualisations of 
being. Its basic point is simple: we classically explain being through the “existence of 
a first term”, like substance or one of the dyad form-matter; but in doing so, we 
foreclose our ability to think it in its becoming (1992). In response, Simondon argues 
S.Wark@warwick.ac.uk 
 
17 
that we can only grasp what an individual is by abjuring explanatory first terms and 
thinking it as it becomes—or, ontogenetically rather than ontologically.  
 
To disentangle becoming from being, Simondon proposes a philosophical framework 
that posits individuals at the nexus of a set of unstable and constantly-negotiated 
relations. Individuations emerge as tensions between a given individual and their 
“preindividual reality”—the field of potential that they possess as individuals and that 
precedes their emergence (1992). This concept sounds as though it posits yet 
another “first term”, but it’s specific to each individual. As Alberto Toscano argues, it’s 
best understood as a “real condition of individuation” rather than an ontological 
proposition (2006: 155, emphasis original). Simondon pits this inner disequilibrium 
against another: the disequilibrium an individual establishes with their environment, 
or milieu. As an individual individuates, they must reciprocally adapt to their milieu. 
Individuation—what we might otherwise call subjectivation—unfolds in relation to 
these internal and external disequilibria, attempting to achieve and conserve 
contingent, “metastable”, states (1992). So, Simondon’s individuals are situated 
between processual dynamism and provisional stability, or internal and external 
relations. Individuation is always “mediate” (1992, 304).  
 
Crucially, Simondon’s technical entities are subject to a much-less-complex 
dynamics of becoming. Technical entities express becoming by regulating their 
relation to their external—“associated”—milieu, but do not have the same capacity to 
regulate an internal milieu. So, they “individualise”—maintaining their internal 
coherence—but do not individuate, or achieve metastable states (Simondon, 2017: 
49; Hui, 2016: 14-15). This conceptual language forecloses the very concept of a 
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digital subject, understood as a technical entity. This poses an obvious question: If 
individuation is incompatible with technical entities, why adopt either term? 
Simondon’s most influential contemporary promulgator, Stiegler, gets around this 
problem by adapting Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological conception of memeory 
and perception to argue that technology informs our individuations directly by acting 
as “retentional apparatuses”, or memory aids, that shape subjectivity by externalising 
our internal processes (e.g. 2014, 50-1). However, Stiegler doesn’t argue that 
technical entities themselves individuate (1998). I want to claim that the digital 
subject is a technical entity and that it individuates, individuating us in turn. Departing 
from Simondon, I want to claim that this technical entity individuates in circulating 
data. These propositions hinge on our being able to specify not only how a digital 
subject stabilises its relation to its associated milieu, but how it expresses a more 
complex form of becoming that we’d usually associate with self-regulating, organic or 
inorganic entities. My gambit is that the expanded concept of the digital subject that 
I’m proposing gives is better purchase on new modes of subjectivity that emerge 
after the internet. Hui’s recent reworking of Simondon’s philosophy provides us with 
the means to substantiate these propositions. 
 
In his recent philosophical work on computation, Hui argues that the global-scale 
networking of computers combined with “the automation of data processing” 
constitutes a technical situation that he refers to as “the digital” (2016, 48-9). Hui 
asserts that the constituents of the digital milieu aren’t code, algorithms, or 
computational processes themselves, but data. Data’s circulating distribution forms 
the technical material by which the internet constitutes a “technical system”, a 
Simondonian term for an emergent, higher-order distributed technologies (Hui, 2016, 
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170). What he calls “the digital” isn’t just an abstract conceptualisation of the internet: 
it’s also an environment. It creates a “digital milieu” that supports the emergence of a 
specific kind of technical entity: what he calls “digital objects” (2016). Hui’s digital 
objects are computational forms or processes that are “constantly in the process of 
reestablishing and renegotiating its relations with other objects, systems, and users 
within their associated milieux [sic]” (Hui, 2016, 57)—or, computational 
environments, such as specific platforms. Crucially, Hui further argues that digital 
objects are too complex, too “dynamic”, and too “energetic” to be conceptualised 
using the circumscribed term “individualisation” (Hui, 2016, 57). The complexity of 
their digital milieus and the recursive capacity to renegotiate their relations to their 
environments, to other digital objects, and, crucially, to themselves outstrips the 
limited form of becoming that Simondon accords to technical entities. They, too, 
mediate internal relations. Their mode of being might be technical, but Hui argues 
that they also possess the—stronger—capacity to individuate. This claim makes it 
possible to propose that the digital subject manifests a technical mode of subjectivity.    
 
At first blush, what I’m calling the digital subject isn’t compatible with Hui’s concepts 
of the digital object and its digital milieu. In more recent work, he expands upon this 
capacity for self-regulation in ways that help us to understand how we might adapt 
his propositions to the digital subject. In an essay on executability in computation, 
Hui argues that self-referential algorithms of the kind that undergird distributed online 
services generate their own “dynamics resembling a self-regulating, self-learning 
process” by employing recursive logics (2017, 28). In language that resonate with 
Bratton’s, Hui also argues that the “role” accorded to the user of self-regulating 
computational processes is always recuperated back to the processes that establish 
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its position in relation to them in advance. Users of computational processes, in his 
view, are already “part of an algorithm” that is not only “part of a database” but is 
also, in part, constitutive of this algorithm’s “executability” (2017, 29). Put otherwise, 
computational processes design user positions as a condition of their capacity to do 
things. Their agency isn’t dependent upon what a user intends; rather, their 
executability accounts for the user in advance by incorporating their position into its 
design. Users are construed as triggers. Recalling Simondon, these technical entities 
don’t draw their sufficiency from their designers, but rather from the working relations 
they establish with their milieus and, recursively, with themselves.  
 
Extrapolating from Hui’s work, the digital subject that occupies the user position is 
neither reducible to the human nor properly a hybrid of the human whom it 
predicates and the computational processes that constitute it. It’s a sufficient 
technical entity. Moreover, its algorithmic capacity to regulate both its relations to its 
digital milieu and to itself, as constituted by data captured by grammars of action and 
circulated by platforms, means that it expresses a level of complexity and aa 
capacity to become that goes beyond Simondon’s technical entities. Online, the 
digital subject individuates, expressing an—again, limited and provisional—mode of 
subjectivity.  
 
In making this claim, I don’t mean to suggest that the digital subject expresses as 
rich a subjectivity as a human. Nor do I mean to displace the human from these 
distributed online services. The concept of the digital subject is most usefully 
understood, I think, in response to the ambiguity that surrounds the subjective status 
of certain computational agents. Is a bot, a script, a machine learning programme a 
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subject? When interfaces obscure what’s on the other side of our—researcher’s—
screens, do we take it at face value that anything that acts as a subject must be a 
subject, adopting an ad-hoc Turing test as a rule of thumb? What do we make of 
emergent agencies exercised by large-scale computational processes? The digital 
subject changes what’s at stake with these questions. If an agent regulates relations 
to its digital milieu and to itself, it expresses a mode of subjectivity. Goriunova’s 
concept is valuable, arguably, because it gives us the conceptual means to turn the 
ambiguity around what a subject is or isn’t online into a research project. In asking 
how subjectivity is processed and what it does, it allows us to think it—in limited 
forms—beyond human predicates and elsewhere, behind the screen. It also 
introduces the means to think how the individuations of a digital subject might 
mediate our individuations, in turn. Returning to Ulman’s work and analysing Blas’s 
will help to show us how.  
 
 
V. VISIBILITY, FACE, SUBJECT 
Ulman’s work is an example of “post-internet art”, a contemporary art movement that 
responds to the internet’s pervasion of everyday life. Melissa Gronlund argues that 
one of the defining tropes of post-internet art is that it thematises the mediated 
presence of the artist in their works, asserting their “specificity” in the face of the 
internet’s liquidation of all in to circulating data (2016, 157). Critics of post-internet art 
argue that its—mostly white—practitioners fail to recognise how visibility is even less 
equitably distributed amongst differently raced, sexed, or gendered bodies (Dean, 
2016), or that it’s often complicit in the expropriations that enable platforms 
(Quaintance, 2015). Whilst Ulman’s work thematises how the injunction to be visible 
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falls unevenly on female-gendered subjects, it certainly seems to participate in 
platforms’ exploitative traffic in subjectivity. But beyond its content and the critiques 
that might be levelled at it, its use of Ulman’s—supposed—specificity also makes the 
grammars of action that enable online visibility apprehensible. 
 
The algorithms that organise the displaying of content on social media platforms 
assign a greater weight to accounts that generate more interaction (Gillespie, 2017). 
In Excellences and Perfections, the different components that constitute the digital 
subject—platform, grammars of action, user position, digital milieu, data—cohere as 
data circulates, encouraging particular kinds of behaviour. Users are motivated to 
continue to interact both when they are interacted with and when platforms metricise 
their interactions (Bucher, 2012). Social media platforms like Instragram not only 
constitute the user in a pre-designed position, but shape users’ actions to suit the 
platform and its grammars of action. The drive to be visible positions the enacted 
digital subject as the medium through which platforms’ grammars individuate us. This 
“us” includes not only the human user who the digital subject nominally predicates, 
but also the other users who interact with a digital subject. To be visible, we must 
present ourselves to the platform. When we shape our actions to suit the platform, 
whether consciously—by trying to be visible—or unconsciously—by simply 
submitting our actions to their grammars—we fit ourselves to their parameters, 
presenting ourselves to be mediated.  
 
This is where the concept of the digital subject takes on its necessity as an 
intermediary and as a means of conceptualising how it is that we are individuated by 
our interactions with distributed online services. The distributed online service inverts 
S.Wark@warwick.ac.uk 
 
23 
the assumed relationship between the digital subject and the human user whom it 
predicates. It can’t operate without us; but, it’s not us that regulates its operations. 
That regulatory principle is defined by the platform to which it belongs. Through 
attempts to garner interaction by adopting normative tropes of gendered online 
modes of expression, Ulman’s performance sets its digital subject to individuating in 
and through her posts, others’ interactions, and the collective modes of participation 
made possible by Instagram’s grammars of action. Its actions are scripted, as per 
the performance’s design; but so much of what makes this performance dynamic 
emerges in and through the contingent, captured, circulating data that constitutes its 
digital subject’s digital milieu. In Simondonian terms, we become material for the 
digital subject’s individuations. That is, we become a part of its “digital milieu”, 
components facilitating actions already set out in its user positions. This “we” 
includes the predicated user, but also other users whose data is captured and 
circulated to form a digital subject’s broader digital milieu.  
 
With this claim, the human subject doesn’t disappear. Rather, the digital subject that 
operates in the user position established by a given service mediates the human 
user’s individuations as it individuates. This is how the injunction to be visible 
subjects us to the digital subject’s individuations. This is also why the digital subject 
remains the subject of circulation—this concept takes seriously that circulation can 
be constitutive of a form of subjectivity, rather than the means by which our data is 
captured. Excellences and Perfections exploits the ambiguities of the digital subject 
for performative ends. It might remain complicit with this platform, but it nevertheless 
makes these ambiguities available for us to critique.  
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Social media are not the only site at which digital subjects emerge. I want to turn to 
Zac Blas’s work Face Cages now to outline how much more limited and much more 
reductive forms of the digital subject can be used to mediate our subjectivity in much 
more overtly political ways. One of the most typical tactics post-internet artists use to 
figure presence in their works is to show a face. The face is often dissimulated as it’s 
presented in Ulman’s and in other post-internet artists’ work, whether quite literally—
via image-processing techniques, like filters, or performative mainstays, like physical 
decoration—or, in a more abstract sense, when it’s entered into circulation. When 
visibility’s what’s valued by distributed online services, faces serve as a means of 
making oneself visible to retain one’s visibility online. Blas’s project Face Cages 
provides us with a different take on how the digital subject processes our faces to 
mediate our subjectivity. Blas’s work, it must be noted, has a self-avowed critical 
relationship to post-internet art (2014). Where Excellences and Perfections tests the 
dynamics of visibility to tease out its ambiguities, Face Cages makes facial 
recognition technologies violently visible to make them available for critique.  
 
Face Cages is an installation and performance. Its key component is a series of 
metal masks, exhibited in photographs worn by a series of models, including Blas 
himself. Blas generated the design of each mask by using facial recognition 
technologies to map the faces of a set of performers. Facial recognition technologies 
use geometrical or statistical techniques to diagram faces. These techniques scan 
and map the relations between the features that make up a face—the distance 
between mouth and nose, for instance, or the curve of a brow—to produce a 
numerical set of ratios that can be translated in to data. In turn, this data can be used 
to identify the person to whom a face belongs. These diagrams are typically 
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processed as code or occasionally seen as images: to make their operations visible, 
Blas turned them in to masks and used them—worn by their corresponding faces—
to produce performances, videos, and images. The aesthetics of these diagrams 
become a part of the digital imaginary’s visual culture, often appearing in images as 
diagrammatic overlays superimposed over faces. This work demonstrates how the 
digital subject can be used to impose negative, diminutive individuations—by 
thematising what it means for our faces to be processed as limited and provisional 
digital subjects by facial recognition technology.  
 
On a thematic level, Face Cages deals with the increasingly rapid spread of facial 
recognition technologies through society. What makes it interesting for our purposes 
is how Blas demonstrates the effects of these technologies on subjectivity. We’ve 
become accustomed to our biometric data being encoded in our passports or visas. 
This technology has also been adopted by technology companies: Facebook uses it 
to automatically tag photographs as they’re uploaded, for instance, and it’s becoming 
an increasingly common security measure that’s used to gain access to 
smartphones and personal computers. Any similarity between these uses may be 
superficial, but the way they function is the same. Facial recognition technologies 
constitute a digital subject as a digital signature. They can facilitate the identification 
of people in images on social media. But they can also have an impact on the ability 
of the subjects they index to move freely or to act. They make visibility a liability by 
diagramming identity as a weapon to be imposed upon its putative owner.  
 
Face Cage’s masks literally materialise the diagrams generated by facial recognition 
technologies. But this materialisation also makes the dynamics of individuation at 
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play in facial recognition technologies available for us to theorise. The facial 
recognition diagram is a digital subject—if not the kind we’ve mostly encountered in 
this article. This digital subject is constituted by a grammar that may not require what 
we would typically think of as an action by a predicated user. At borders, our mobility 
is often premised on us submitting a digital photograph that can be used to extract 
our biometric data. On Facebook, our uploaded photographs constitute the data 
that’s used to train the platform’s facial recognition algorithms. In public, our 
movements expose our faces to capture by surveillance technologies. In each case, 
the action is a transactional submission: we must accompany a function—crossing a 
border, auto-tagging a photograph, simply being in public—with data. This 
transaction isn’t always intentional. Blas’s work demonstrates how a digital subject is 
constituted with this data. In Blas’s work, these diagrams are manifested as its 
eponymous Cages; that is, as objects that are imposed, that constrain, and that mark 
out limits. These diagrams nominally identify us by matching our data to our face. 
This “our” is misleading. As data, our faces are no longer our own; they’re 
individuated instead as a digital subject that most definitely indexes our identity, even 
if it can’t—doesn’t attempt to—encompass our subjectivity. As the objectified masks 
in Blas’s work suggest, this individuation changes our relationship to our faces. It 
renders our faces as objects. 
 
After facial recognition, the face itself no longer needs to fulfil the role of 
identification. It now validates the identity that’s held in, and iterated as, data. When 
our faces become data and are set aside to be used against us, they are no longer 
ours. In the process, our identities are recuperated to data. Facial recognition 
technologies enter our faces into circulation and apply them back to us. Our 
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intentional or unintentional submission of our faces as data foreshadows an act of 
application that diminishes the set of possible individuations we can experience as 
subjects by subjecting us to a diminished set of possibilities. The “you” these 
individuations make possible either is or is not you, with the result that a recognition 
algorithm might be wrong; or your phone won’t unlock; or, at the extreme end, that 
you’ll be arrested or that you’ll be detained at the border and returned.  
 
Blas’s Face Cages thematises the negative uses to which the digital subject can be 
put. It places the individuations that the digital subject mediates on a continuum: 
some of these are developing becomings; some diminish and partition the subject 
they predicate. Blas’s work demonstrates how facial recognition technologies reduce 
us to the identification of their face with a string of code. Ulman’s work demonstrates 
an inverse example of this relationship. By submitting herself to Instagram’s 
grammars of action, she sets a digital subject to individuating—and exploits its 
visibility and capacity to be identified with her to allow it to individuate apart from her. 
These processes sit on a continuum. They are not inherently political, per se. To 
think them as such would be to misunderstand the role that the digital subject, 
understood as a technical entity, plays in mediating our individuations. Rather, this is 
why the concept of the digital subject is necessary—it helps us to sort the cultural-
political stakes of particular techniques of data capture; to understand their technical 
bases; and to be able to critique the cultural politics that particular grammars of 
action set in train.  
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
S.Wark@warwick.ac.uk 
 
28 
In one of his many infamous statements, Friedrich Kittler claimed that the 
development of the IF/THEN command in early twentieth-century computing 
transformed subjectivity: “[a] simple feedback loop — and information machines 
bypass humans, their so-called inventors. Computers themselves become subjects” 
(Kittler, 1999: 258). This statement has been superseded—if it was ever even true—
by the digital subject and its digital milieu: circulating data. The aim of this article has 
been to introduce a conceptual language that we can use to conceptualise and to 
critique emergent modes of technical subjectivity made possible by the internet—
which it followed Olga Goriunova in calling the digital subject. Using the media-
theoretical concepts of the user, the platform, and grammars of action alongside 
Simondon and Hui’s philosophies of technology, it argued that the digital subject is a 
technical entity. Whilst admitting that the technical subjectivity expressed by the 
digital subject is limited, it argued that it provides us with the conceptual means to 
apprehend and to critique the cultural politics of subjectivity that have been instigated 
by the proliferation of data capture techniques.  
 
The conceptual language that this article has developed in order to think these 
individuations might seem determined to exclude the you—us—from any 
conceptualisation of online subjectivity. This has not been my aim. Rather, my aim 
has been to try to introduce a conceptual language that we can use to specify, open 
up, and critique some of the individuations that subjectivity is subject to in the 
present. The political stakes of this approach should hopefully have been made clear 
by this article’s engagement with Ulman’s and Blas’s artistic projects. Each of these 
projects make the enactment of digital subjects visible to expose the cultural political 
stakes of visibility today. They also demonstrate how conceptualising the digital 
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subject can help us to engage with the uses to which “our” subjectivity can be put 
once its captured and aggregated in circulating data. Once the digital subject is seen 
to be what individuates online, its capacity to individuate us in turn becomes 
available for critique. More than this, its capacity to affect us beyond the confines of 
the internet become available for scrutiny.  
 
This article has been braided through with the notion that the digital subject is in 
circulation—in the strong sense of this phrase. My concept of the digital subject has 
been predicated on the idea that it is constituted in and as circulating data. In lieu of 
articulating what circulation has meant directly, I’ve tried to use analyses of Ulman’s 
and Blas’s work to illustrate what’s at stake in the conceptual claim that circulation is 
constitutive of something like a digital subject. The cultural politics of data is the 
cultural politics of their capture, their aggregation, and their processing—in sum, their 
circulation. If the digital subject is the subject of circulation, its critical leverage is 
most effective at those points at which our data are extracted and put to other uses; 
or, at those gaps occupied by constructs like the digital subject, those points of 
transition between data and us. From here, individuations—limited, provisional, but 
massively distributed—proliferate.     
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